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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter addresses a particularly vulnerable population of children, namely, children
associated with armed forces or armed groups. These children are colloquially known as
child soldiers. This chapter begins by surveying the prevalence of child soldiering global
ly. It then sets out the considerable amount of international law that addresses children in
armed conflict, in particular, the law that allocates responsibility for child soldiering and
the law that sets out the responsibility of child soldiers for their conduct. The chapter
identifies significant gaps between the law and the securing of positive outcomes for for
mer child soldiers, notably when it comes to post-conflict reintegration. The protective
impulse that envisions militarized youth as faultless passive victims may not always re
flect how youthful fighters see themselves nor necessarily support an emancipatory and
empowering vision of how international law should promote the rights of children.
Keywords: recruitment, enlistment, children, atrocity crimes, reintegration, DDR, children’s rights, child soldiers

1 Introduction
CHILDREN have been enmeshed in armed conflict throughout history.1 At times, and for
multiplicities of causes both emancipatory and baleful, such children have been seen as
heroes. I live in Lexington, Virginia, home to the Virginia Military Institute, whose cadets
—many aged fifteen to eighteen—fiercely fought for the Confederacy in the 1864 Battle of
New Market. These cadets were credited with the victory over Union forces. The
Stonewall Jackson Memorial Hall, situated in the heart of the campus, displays a sprawl
ing mural by Benjamin Clinedinst which lionizes the youthful cadets’ battle charge.
Among Colombia’s national heroes, commemorated in a dynamic monument to los
valerosos e insobornables niños, is twelve-year-old Pedro Pascasio Martínez, fabled for
preventing the escape of a Spanish commander who sought to flee following the Battle of
Boyacá—a pivotal event in the country’s independence in 1819. These are just two of
many examples of memorials, commemorations, and elegies for children that salute them
for their martial pride, service to their patrie, and political engagement.
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Children in Armed Conflict
The emergence of international human rights law, international criminal law, and interna
tional humanitarian law has, however, shifted public perceptions of children entangled in
armed conflict. So, too, have a series of powerful autobiographies and documentaries that
have disseminated to global audiences the horrors of the child soldier experience.2 Such
children are increasingly being seen as victims, and the involvement of children in armed
conflict is emerging not as untoward and undesirable or a desperate last stand but, in
stead, as flatly unlawful. The relationship of the child with armed conflict has shifted from
one regulated by ethics and morality to one constructed by law and public policy. Many
activist and humanitarian groups gravitate to the cause of ending child soldiering. Con
siderable funds have been deployed in this struggle. The United Nations Security Council,
generally fractured, has succeeded in issuing eleven (p. 658) resolutions over the past two
decades on children in armed conflict. UNICEF and other UN organs also have been
deeply invested in the cause of ending child soldiering.3
The child soldier therefore suffuses the international legal imagination. Mostly, this figure
evokes imagery of a poor, kidnapped, prepubescent African boy, in dilapidated sandals,
barely able to hold his AK-47. This essentialized image nonetheless belies the far greater
complexity of where children become implicated in armed conflict, when (as a matter of
age) children become soldiers, as well as how and why they become implicated. Readers
may be surprised to learn: many child soldiers are found outside of Africa; many children
fulfill functions that do not involve carrying weapons; most child soldiers world wide are
adolescents rather than young children; the most common path to militarized life is not
abduction and kidnapping, but for children to come forward with varying degrees of voli
tion and become enlisted; and children may face greater threats from their side than from
the enemy. What is more, it is estimated that 40 percent of child soldiers world wide are
girls. The invisibility of the girl soldier from the imagery of child soldiering and hence
from rehabilitative and reintegrative programming remains deeply disappointing.
Accordingly, in recent decades the well-worn phrase child soldier has become disfavored.
The 2007 Paris Commitments and Paris Principles,4 two connected nonbinding instru
ments endorsed by 108 states,5 instead normalize different language: “a child associated
with an armed force or armed group.” The Paris Principles did so to underscore the diver
sity of roles children may play in armed conflict. An armed force refers to the national
militaries of a state, whereas an armed group refers to a fighting force that is separate
from a state, for example, rebel groups such as the northern Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) and Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). According to the
Paris Principles:
“A child associated with an armed force or armed group” refers to any person be
low 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or
armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys, and girls
used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does
not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.
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The Paris Principles map onto international child rights law by affirming the chronologi
cal divide of eighteen as the transition point between childhood and adulthood. Assuredly,
the phrase “children associated with armed forces and armed groups” is somewhat
tongue-tying, so UN agencies and international activists have turned to the acronym
CAAFAG instead. Yet this, too, is phonetically awkward and creates a bit of an alphabet
soup. Hence, in this chapter I tend to deploy the term child soldier but always understand
the meaning of the term to reflect the definition as provided by the Paris Principles. Al
though terminology matters, it might also be helpful to revisit the term soldiering instead
of abandoning it and to recognize that in contemporary conflict it is the act of soldiering
itself that could be rendered more definitionally capacious. On this note, it is striking that
the most recent set of political commitments on the topic, fostered by the Canadian gov
ernment in 2017, are expressly titled the Vancouver Principles on (p. 659) Peacekeeping
and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers.6 These Principles strive
to prevent child recruitment in the context of peacekeeping operations and mandate
peacekeepers to receive clear guidance regarding children associated with armed forces
or armed groups.
To be sure, children intersect with armed conflict even if they are not part of an armed
group or an armed force. Children suffer terribly from conflict-related violence. Hence,
this chapter also will discuss children not at all associated with an armed force or armed
group as well as children associated with groups, for example, terrorist organizations,
when debate arises whether or not that group has the capacity to engage in armed con
flict and hence would qualify as an armed group. On a more general note, it has been es
timated that 246 million children live in areas riven with armed conflict, of which 125 mil
lion are directly affected by conflict worldwide.7
This chapter intends to accomplish several goals. First, so as to situate the reader, it of
fers a concise global survey of children associated with armed forces and armed groups.
It then sets out the content of international law when it comes to the regulation of child
soldiering. It does so through two steps: assessing the responsibility for child soldiering
(i.e., when recruitment of children into armed groups or armed forces is unlawful) and
then the responsibility of child soldiers (i.e., the consequences that arise when child sol
diers commit criminal atrocities). This chapter explores challenges that inhere in reinte
grating these vulnerable populations into civilian life. In conclusion, it posits that an im
portant path forward is to ensure that the best interests of the child principle, situated in
Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), be fully actu
ated. Respecting best interests means foregrounding the voices of the children them
selves. On this note, the protective impulse that envisions militarized youth as faultless,
passive victims may not always reflect how youthful fighters see themselves nor necessar
ily support an emancipatory and empowering vision of how international law should pro
mote the rights of children.
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2 Practices of Child Soldiering
It is generically estimated that, in recent decades, from two hundred and fifty to three
hundred thousand children worldwide are associated with armed forces or armed groups.
Child soldiers—as with former child soldiers—exist in each of the world’s regions. States
recruit, to be sure, but in 2016 the Office of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on Children and Armed Conflict found that non-state armed groups constitute
fifty-four out of sixty-three parties listed for grave violations against children.8 Overall,
the Special Representative found that in 2016 concerns lingered but progress was made
in the Philippines, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Colombia, Sudan, Mali,
Nigeria, and the Central African Republic; significant challenges were identified in
Afghanistan, Somalia (where the number of militarily recruited children doubled in 2016),
South Sudan, Yemen, Nigeria, Iraq, and Syria.
Child soldiering is a global phenomenon that is much more nuanced than might
appear at first blush.
(p. 660)

Child soldiers have been recruited into the Bolivian armed forces. Children have partici
pated in armed violence in Guatemala and Peru. In Colombia, child soldiers were volun
tarily enlisted and were forcibly recruited into armed opposition groups (the FARC and
the ELN), where they laid mines and undertook support tasks. The largest pro-govern
ment paramilitary group, the AUC, also recruited child soldiers. Peace negotiations in
Colombia have demobilized many FARC child soldiers and former child soldiers. Ques
tions persist as to how such former child fighters should be reintegrated and whether
they ought to face restorative processes or some element of retributive justice for crimes
they may have committed during the armed conflict.
UNICEF estimates more than six thousand cases of child recruitment between 2003 and
2008 by rebels in Sri Lanka. The LTTE—a group of violent secessionists who fought the
Sri Lankan government until its defeat in 2009—turned extensively to child soldiers. The
Khmer Rouge used youthful cadres in the Cambodian killing fields between 1975 and
1979. Myanmar’s government recruits children through harsh methods. One quarter of
its national armed forces (the Tatmadaw) is estimated to be composed of persons under
the age of eighteen. Child soldiers also are found within the many non-state armed
groups in Myanmar. In Nepal, child soldiers—three thousand of whom were released in
early 2010 as part of peace negotiations—participated in Maoist rebel groups. Child sol
diers served in pro-Indonesian militia forces in Timor-Leste. Children have furthermore
been associated with armed forces or armed groups in Bangladesh, Laos, Pakistan, Thai
land, the Philippines, and Jammu and Kashmir.
Children have fought in Iraq and in Iran. Child soldiers have fought, killed, and died in
Afghanistan through successive conflicts; children also are recruited into Afghan police
forces.9 In Palestine, the face of the first intifada was youthful: among those arrested, the
average age was seventeen.10 Israel has imprisoned Palestinian children for security of
fenses and for being associated with an armed group. Conflict in Yemen and Syria en
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meshes children as participants. This entire region is seeing an escalation in the numbers
of children associated with armed forces and armed groups. ISIS now presents one of the
most visible cases of child soldiering. Circulated through social media, haunting imagery
of beheadings and murders committed by the “cubs of the caliphate” shock the con
science. ISIS also succeeds in recruiting minors, frequently through abductions and
brainwashing, but also because youths come forth on their own initiative and wish to en
roll. Influenced by social networking and web-interfaces, adolescents have traveled long
distances to join ISIS, often but not always under false pretenses. Children have carried
out numerous terroristic attacks, including suicide bombings, throughout Iraq.11 These
children tend to be seen less as passive victims by the international community and more
as threats to be disabled in counterterrorism programs, in part because of political im
pulses that treat these children differently from others associated with armed groups.
Children associated with groups labeled as terroristic and extremist are therefore among
the most vulnerable and poorly served by current policies. Throughout 2017 authorities
in Iraq, Kurdistan, and Syria routinely detained and abused children (p. 661) suspected of
association with ISIS. The Office of the Special Representative specifically criticizes the
detention by states of children for alleged association with such armed groups and, as
well, the use by these armed groups of children as human bombs.12 On this note, Princi
ple 9 of the 2017 Vancouver Principles requires:
To ensure that all children apprehended and/or temporarily detained in accor
dance with mission-specific military rules of engagement are treated in a manner
consistent with international norms and standards, as well as the special status,
needs, and rights of children and to ensure that detention is used as a measure of
last resort, for the shortest possible period of time, and with the best interests of
the child as a primary consideration, and that they are handed over expeditiously
to child protection actors and civilian authorities in line with the established poli
cies and guidance.
Virtually all of the multiple sides to endemic conflict in the DRC conscripted, enlisted, or
actively used child soldiers. Although the involvement of children in armed conflict in the
DRC has attenuated over time, it has not disappeared. Armed conflict in Angola and
Mozambique—now quiescent—had directly implicated thousands of children, often
forcibly, but also through self-enlistment for ideological or material aspirations.13
Children actively serve as combatants in conflicts in the Central African Republic (CAR),
Chad, and Côte d’Ivoire. The use of child soldiers also is reported in Burundi and Zimbab
we. Evidence of child soldiering among national armed forces recently has emerged in
Somalia. Charles Taylor, the former Liberian head of state now jailed by the Special Court
for Sierra Leone (SCSL), had initially built an army around child soldiers. Government
forces and rebel groups in the Sudan turned to child soldiers throughout internecine con
flict, most extensively in the 1990s, though recourse to children still persists. In South Su
dan, child soldiering is on the rise. Boko Haram, a group in Nigeria, viciously kidnaps and
abuses children. In response, the Nigerian government is currently thought to be detain
ing thousands of children (as well as adults) who it fears are associated with Boko Haram.
Many of the detained have been encountered during military operations, but others—in
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cluding large numbers of children—appear to have been arrested arbitrarily as they fled
from Boko Haram.
Children suffered terribly in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Hutu extremists targeted Tutsi
children, even infants, for elimination. Many children witnessed graphic violence. Minors
also became perpetrators. Some manned the barricades that identified the Tutsi “cock
roaches” to be eliminated. Youths—many of them teenagers—also became central to the
effort to oust the genocidal government. These youths staffed the ranks of the Rwandese
Patriotic Army (RPA), the only military force actually to intercede to halt the genocide.
In Northern Uganda, a recurrent estimate puts the number of children abducted by the
rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) at between twenty-five and thirty-eight thousand.14
At some points, minors constitute 90 percent of LRA forces. Nearly all have escaped or
surrendered, and the LRA has been massively weakened. Notwithstanding having been
indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, LRA (p. 662) leader
Joseph Kony remains at large, though a lower-level commander, Dominic Ongwen (him
self a former child soldier brutally kidnapped into the LRA at the age of nine), is currently
on trial there. Ongwen faces seventy-one counts of crimes against humanity and war
crimes (the largest number of charges ever brought against anyone by an international
court or tribunal).
Thousands of children were associated with all sides of the conflict that raged in Sierra
Leone from 1991 to 2002. Although children were recruited by force, significant numbers
willingly joined. Among Sierra Leone’s child soldiers, commission of atrocities (including
amputations of the hands and feet of civilian populations), resocialization into violence,
and compelled drug use all were widespread. Most child soldiers remained low-level aux
iliaries, but some over the age of fifteen became generals.15
Children have served as fighters in recent conflicts in Chechnya, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Serbia. Many states—including the United Kingdom, the United States,
China, India, the Netherlands, Canada, France, New Zealand, Germany, and Australia—
permit voluntary recruitment of minors into national armed forces, albeit largely under
strict conditions.

3 Legal Responsibility for Child Soldiering
The CRC affirms that states “shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who
have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities.”16 CRC
Article 38(3) provides that “States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who
has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces ….” The Optional Proto
col to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, which was adopted in
2000, entered into force in 2002.17 As of 2017, 167 states are parties thereto. The Option
al Protocol aims to remedy some of the CRC’s perceived inadequacies. It specifies that
states “shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who
have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.”18 On the one
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hand, the Optional Protocol reflects an incremental move, in that the language “all feasi
ble measures” does not plainly read as imperative. On the other hand, the Optional Proto
col has been interpreted as “elevating the minimum age for combat participation to 18.”19
A firmer ban emerges in Article 2, which provides that states “shall ensure that persons
who have not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed
forces.” Optional Protocol Article 3(1) then somewhat nebulously adds:
States Parties shall raise the minimum age for the voluntary recruitment of per
sons into their national armed forces from that set out in article 38, paragraph 3,
of the [CRC], taking account of the principles contained in that article and recog
nizing that under the [CRC] persons under the age of 18 years are entitled to spe
cial protection.
Article 3(1) mandates that states increase the threshold age for the voluntary re
cruitment of persons into their national armed forces beyond fifteen—ostensibly, then, at
the very least to sixteen. The Optional Protocol stricto sensu permits recruitment of six
teen- and seventeen-year-olds into national armed forces. Their recruitment, however, is
to be genuinely voluntary and carried out with the informed consent of the recruit’s par
ents or legal guardians; in addition, such recruits are to be fully informed of the duties in
(p. 663)

volved in service and must provide reliable proof of age.20
The Optional Protocol requires each state party to deposit a binding declaration upon rat
ification or accession that sets forth its minimum age of voluntary recruitment as deter
mined under national law. Among states that have filed declarations, approximately threequarters list minimum ages of voluntary recruitment of eighteen or older (a large majori
ty within this group declare eighteen).21 A generalized practice, therefore, is emerging (at
least if the metric is to undertake a head count of states). Examples of states that, as of
August 2018 declare ages lower than eighteen, include: seventeen-and-a-half years
(Malaysia); seventeen years (Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Cabo Verde, China, Cuba,
France, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Israel, Netherlands (as military personnel on proba
tion), New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, and United States); the “1st January of the year they
become 17 years old” (Brazil, for military service); sixteen-and-a-half years (Singapore);
and sixteen years (Bangladesh, Belize, Canada, Egypt, El Salvador, Guyana,22 India, and
the United Kingdom). It is noteworthy that certain of these states have large armed
forces.
The Optional Protocol is more restrictive in cases of armed groups. These groups “should
not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18
years.”23 What is more, pursuant to Article 4(2), states agree to take “all feasible mea
sures” to criminalize such practices. State responsibility therefore arises, at least in theo
ry.
Other international and regional instruments also address recruitment of children into
armed forces or armed groups. The International Labor Organization’s Convention No.
182 on the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labor defines a child as a person under the age of eighteen.24 This convention ex
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plicitly links “forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict” to
“slavery or practices similar to slavery” and obliges ratifying member states to “take im
mediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination” thereof.25 The
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which came into force in Novem
ber 1999, defines a child as “every human being below the age of 18 years” and requires
parties to “take all necessary measures to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in
hostilities and refrain, in particular, from recruiting any child.”26
Article 38(1) of the CRC requires that states “undertake to respect and to ensure respect
for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which
are relevant to the child.” How does international humanitarian law approach children?
The Fourth Geneva Convention, which concerns civilian persons, grants a number of spe
cial protections to children.27 These protections, which may begin at different ages
(twelve, fifteen, or eighteen), include barring the occupying power from (p. 664) com
pelling persons under the age of eighteen to work. In 1977 two Additional Protocols were
added to the Geneva Conventions (one for international armed conflict (I), the other (II)
for non-international armed conflict). Article 77(1) of Additional Protocol I mandates for
parties to a conflict that “[c]hildren shall be the object of special respect and shall be pro
tected against any form of indecent assault.”28 Article 77(2) states that “Parties to the
conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained the
age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall re
frain from recruiting them into their armed forces” while also specifying that “[i]n recruit
ing among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not at
tained the age of eighteen years the Parties to the conflict shall endeavor to give priority
to those who are oldest.” Article 77(3) addresses what a party is to do when it captures
enemy fighters who, despite the requirements of Article 77(2), are under the age of fif
teen. In such situations, such captured persons “continue to benefit from the special pro
tection accorded.…, whether or not they are prisoners of war.” Furthermore, pursuant to
Article 77(4), “If arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict,
children shall be held in quarters separate from the quarters of adults, except where fam
ilies are accommodated as family units.” Additional Protocol I also accords children prior
ity in the distribution of relief consignments and restricts the ability of a party to the con
flict to evacuate children other than its nationals to a foreign country.29
Additional Protocol II, which covers non-international armed conflict, asserts in Article
4(3)(c) that “children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be re
cruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities.”30 This prohi
bition is firmer than its counterpart for international armed conflict in Additional Protocol
I. Article 4(3) of Additional Protocol II, which generally requires that “children shall be
provided with the care and aid they require,” makes specific (though not exclusive) refer
ence to education, family reunification, and the temporary removal of children from areas
plagued by hostilities to safer areas. Similarly to Additional Protocol I, in Article 4(3)(d)
Additional Protocol II extends special protection to children below the age of fifteen even
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“if they take a direct part in hostilities despite the provisions of subparagraph (c) and are
captured.”
In international and non-international armed conflict, the conscription, enlistment, or use
of children under the age of fifteen to participate actively in hostilities is a war crime to
which individual criminal responsibility attaches. The unlawfulness of illicit recruitment
thereby expands to include both state responsibility as well as individual penal culpability
in the case of children under the age of fifteen. This proscription is both conventional and
customary. A fundamental precept underpinning this war crime is that “[r]esponsibility is
placed on the adult who permits participation and never on the child.”31 Prosecutions
have occurred at the SCSL and ICC.
In fact, the ICC issued its very first conviction solely on three counts of child soldier
crimes, precluded in non-international armed conflict by Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)
(xxvi) (a different but identically worded provision, Article 8(2)(e)(vii), addresses interna
tional armed conflict).32 In Prosecutor v. Lubanga, a rebel leader in the DRC was (p. 665)
sentenced to fourteen years’ imprisonment. Jurisprudence from these two institutions has
clarified important aspects of this war crime. For example, in Prosecutor v. Brima, Kama
ra, and Kanu (the AFRC case), a SCSL Trial Chamber defined conscription as implying
“compulsion” and as encompassing “acts of coercion, such as abductions and forced re
cruitment.”33 It defined enlistment as “accepting and enrolling individuals when they vol
unteer to join an armed force or group,” which it immediately qualified by adding: “Enlist
ment is a voluntary act, and the child’s consent is therefore not a valid defence.”34 The
bottom line is that enlistment of children under the age of fifteen is impermissible regard
less of circumstances. Consent of the child is no defense. In another case, the SCSL Ap
peals Chamber assessed the required nexus between a defendant and the moment at
which a child had actually been enlisted into the CDF. This court understood enlistment to
mean “any conduct accepting the child as part of the militia” but added that “there must
be a nexus between the act of the accused and the child joining the armed force or
group”; “knowledge on the part of the accused that the child is under the age of 15”; and
knowledge that the child “may be trained for combat.”35 In Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon,
and Gbao, the SCSL found that active participation in hostilities included committing
crimes against civilians, engaging in arson, guarding military objectives and mines, and
serving as spies and bodyguards.36 In Prosecutor v. Lubanga, the ICC judges followed
similar understandings to those of the SCSL. Enlistment was understood to mean “to en
roll on the list of a military body,” while conscription means to “enlist compulsorily.”37 In
terms of using children to participate actively, the Lubanga judgment underscored the
need for a case-by-case approach to establish the link between the activity for which the
child is used and the combat in which the armed group or armed force is engaged. Anoth
er accused, Katanga, was acquitted in a subsequent case of child soldiering charges be
cause of a lack of nexus between him and the illicit practices of child soldiering in the
DRC. In terms of sentencing, it has been noted that crimes against or affecting children
should be regarded as particularly grave given that children enjoy special recognition and
protection under international law.
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The SCSL also has addressed crimes against humanity that may disproportionately affect
children. SCSL Statute Article 2(i) proscribes “other inhumane acts,” which the AFRC
appeals judgment interpreted as including acts of forced marriage perpetrated against
girls. Certain other Rome Statute proscriptions bear on violence that may disproportion
ately, though certainly not exclusively, harm children. In terms of war crimes, one exam
ple is intentionally attacking buildings dedicated to education provided they are not mili
tary objectives; the crimes against humanity of enslavement, sexual slavery, and enforced
prostitution also come to mind; as do the crimes of forcible transfer of children and child
trafficking.38 Furthermore, Rome Statute Article 6(e) includes, within the definition of
genocide, the forcible transfer of children of one enumerated group to another enumerat
ed group.
The Rome Statute also permits reparations to victims, including children under the age of
eighteen. The ICC may make a reparative order directly against a convicted person,
though such individuals are generally impecunious; it also can order the reparative
(p. 666) award to be made through a separate trust fund for victims.39 To date, this trust
fund has allocated funds derived from voluntary grants by states to inter alia a number of
projects in Uganda and the DRC. Beneficiary projects include programs for child soldiers
and abductees as well as programs geared to communities, war victims, victims of sexual
violence, teenage mothers, orphans, and also programs to support services, agricultural
initiatives, and communications. The Lubanga case has established principles and prac
tices for the distribution of reparations.
Individual penal responsibility for illicit recruitment of children is also entering national
criminal jurisdictions. As the age of unlawful recruitment inches towards eighteen, it may
also be that the scope of individual criminal responsibility for such recruitment moves up
ward to eighteen.
How far can a handful of criminal trials for adult recruiters go in terms of prevention?
Cause for skepticism arises in terms of the deterrent value of such trials.40 One major gap
in the enforcement network is state responsibility for the use of children in armed forces.
The conduct of the United States is a telling example. In 2008, the US passed the Child
Soldiers Protection Act. This legislation forbids the US from giving military aid to any for
eign government that systematically uses children in its armed forces. Yet the law also
permits a waiver even for delinquent countries. Beginning in 2010 and for six years there
after, then-President Barack Obama allocated over $1.2 billion in military assistance and
arms to governments that use child soldiers while only withholding $61 million.41 He did
so, he said, in the US “national interest.”
One tough issue remains. May child fighters be targeted during armed conflict? If so, how
and under which circumstances? International law affirms a duty to respect and protect
children in armed conflicts along with a duty to promote the best interests of children.
Overcoming the presumption of civilian status might therefore require more than would
be the case for an adult. In addition, even if a child is deemed targetable, the allowable
means and methods must reflect the protected status of children in international law.42
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Provisions establishing a special duty to respect and protect children may tip the balance
in favor of a duty to capture, where feasible. A new doctrine—described as the first of its
kind—adopted by the Canadian Armed Forces in 2017 reflects a balance between security
concerns and human and child rights concerns in the specific context of underage fight
ers.43 On the one hand, this document accords armed forces personnel the right to use
force to protect themselves from the threat of serious injury or death. It recognizes that
children may pose as grave a threat as adults. On the other hand, this doctrine states that
Canadian troops should “seek to de-escalate confrontations with child soldiers.” If forced
to engage child soldiers, the doctrine states that armed forces personnel “seek to engage
adults within the group first,” under the assumption that if the adult leader is eliminated
or removed, then the armed group might dissolve. The doctrine adds that, if captured, un
derage fighters should be confined separately from adult detainees and that considera
tion should be given to grouping the children themselves according to their ages. Child
detainees must then be turned over to nongovernmental organizations as soon as possi
ble for purposes of counseling, rehabilitation, and family reunification.

(p. 667)

4 Penal Responsibility of Child Soldiers

Child soldiers suffer crimes, and child soldiering is a crime, but child soldiers also may
commit crimes—including grievous atrocities. The victims of violent acts by child soldiers
may include children as well as adults.
Although criminally prosecuting child soldiers for their alleged involvement in acts of
atrocity is technically permissible under international law, such a move increasingly is
viewed as inappropriate and undesirable.
The CRC nonetheless permits the “arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child” but re
quires that these measures “shall be used only as a … last resort and for the shortest ap
propriate period of time.”44 The CRC precludes the death penalty and life imprisonment
without parole as sentences for children who are convicted of offenses. The CRC requires
that “every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered
in the child’s best interest not to do so.”45 It specifies a minimum level of due process pro
tection for children subject to criminal proceedings but also encourages the development
of enhanced frameworks attuned to their specific needs. The CRC does not favor incar
ceration, preferring instead rehabilitation and reintegration. That said, the CRC does not
bar incarceration. Article 40(3)(a) of the CRC requires parties to seek to promote the es
tablishment of “a minimum age below which children shall be presumed not to have the
capacity to infringe the penal law” but sets no such age. That said, the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, which helps monitor state compliance with the CRC, has considered
fourteen as a low age for criminal responsibility and “has welcomed … proposals to set
the age of criminal responsibility at eighteen.”46
What is the general practice within national jurisdictions when it comes to minors who
commit ordinary common crimes? A sampling of baseline ages of criminal responsibility
over the past decade include: seven (Switzerland, Nigeria, South Africa); ten (Australia,
Page 11 of 20

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: Washington and Lee University; date: 08 May 2020

Children in Armed Conflict
New Zealand); twelve (Canada, Netherlands, Uganda); thirteen (France); fourteen (Japan,
Germany, Austria, Italy, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone); fifteen (Sweden, Norway, Den
mark); sixteen (Spain, Portugal), and eighteen (Belgium, Brazil, Peru).47 It is not uncom
mon for states to adjust these ages, and the trajectory of such moves is upward. National
ages of criminal responsibility may be gradated. This means that jurisdictions establish
an age of criminal responsibility and a separate age of adult criminal responsibility.
Turning to international humanitarian law, Article 68 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Conven
tion precludes imposing the death penalty on “a protected person who was under eigh
teen years of age at the time of the offence,” as do both of the 1977 Additional Protocols.
Consequently, the Fourth Geneva Convention and both Additional Protocols contemplate
that minors can incur responsibility for war crimes. These instruments bar only the harsh
est punishments.
In 1996, pursuant to a UN General Assembly resolution, Graça Machel of Mozam
bique submitted a ground-breaking report entitled “Impact of Armed Conflict on
Children” (widely known as the Machel Report).48 The Machel Report was a front runner
in sensitizing the international community to the hazardous effects of violent conflict on
children, including child soldiers. It has had tremendous social constructivist influence. In
(p. 668)

light of the Machel Report’s recommendation, for example, the Office of the Special Rep
resentative on Children and Armed Conflict was established within the UN system.
The Machel Report identifies child soldiers as victims and targets and, also, “even” as
perpetrators.49 That said, it didactically presents acts of atrocity perpetrated by child sol
diers as the product of coercion or manipulation by adults. The Machel Report recognizes
the complexities of “balancing culpability, a community’s sense of justice and the ‘best in
terests of the child’.”50 It does not explicitly disclaim the penal responsibility of child sol
diers, but neither does it encourage child soldiers to become subjects of criminal prosecu
tions. Paris Principle 8.6 flatly states that “[c]hildren should not be prosecuted by an in
ternational court or tribunal.” The Paris Principles also address truth-seeking and recon
ciliation mechanisms:
8.15 All children who take part in these mechanisms, including those who have
been associated with armed forces or armed groups should be treated equally as
witnesses or as victims.
8.16 Children’s participation in these mechanisms must be voluntary. No provision
of services or support should be dependent on their participation in these mecha
nisms.
The approach of the Paris Principles to preclude international criminal trials and dissuade
national criminal trials is to be welcomed. So, too, is the Paris Principles’ commendation
of truth-seeking and reconciliation mechanisms and support (albeit quite cursory) of tra
ditional rituals. That said, the Paris Principles shrink the ability of such mechanisms to ex
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plore fully the multidimensionality of child soldier returnees, notably their roles as perpe
trators. Accordingly, the application of such mechanisms thins and becomes superficial.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) and a
variety of other institutions, including the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMTs), con
cerned themselves with the crimes of Nazi Germany. No mention was made in the Nurem
berg Statute, Control Council Law No. 10, or Control Council Ordinance No. 7 of the age
at which criminal responsibility began; in any event, no minor was charged under any of
these instruments. Although the IMT prosecuted Baldur von Schirach for inter alia his
use of the Hitler Youth, it did not address crimes committed by the youth themselves. The
constitutive statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (IC
TY, 1993) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994) similarly offer
no guidance regarding the age of criminal responsibility. The Rome Statute of the Inter
national Criminal court has no jurisdiction over any person who is under the age of eigh
teen at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.51
The SCSL Statute limited the SCSL’s jurisdiction to defendants who were fifteen
years of age or older at the time of the alleged offense.52 The SCSL Statute gave special
considerations to “juvenile offenders,” that is, defendants under the age of eighteen at
(p. 669)

the time of the alleged offense and exempted them from incarceration.53 Instead, the
SCSL “shall order any of the following: care guidance and supervision orders, community
service orders, counselling, foster care, correctional, educational and vocational training
programmes, approved schools and, as appropriate, any programmes of disarmament, de
mobilization and reintegration or programmes of child protection agencies.”54 The SCSL’s
first chief prosecutor promptly and unequivocally stated that he would never prosecute
children under the age of eighteen, including child soldiers, inter alia, because they do
not bear the greatest responsibility.55 Indeed, none were prosecuted.
But these international institutions can prosecute and incarcerate former child soldiers
who committed crimes as adults. Currently, as noted above, Dominic Ongwen faces prose
cution in The Hague on many counts of horrific crimes.56 Ongwen himself was a violently
abducted and abused child soldier. Ongwen came of age in the LRA. He rose through the
ranks from nothing to a brigadier commander. He fled the LRA in his early forties, surren
dered to US Special Forces, and was transferred to the ICC. Questions persist as to
whether, and if so to what extent, his background as an abducted child matter in terms of
penal liability. Indications thus far are that this background matters little, though it could,
perhaps, emerge as a mitigating factor in sentencing in the event Ongwen is convicted.

5 Reintegration and Homecoming
I did step on the egg, it broke beneath my foot and I moved into the compound.
She was crying all this time. As if that wasn’t enough, she had to carry me on her
back as if I was a two year old kid. She took me to the house, never asked me any
thing about the bush.57
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This is how Alex Olango, a formerly abducted child soldier, discusses his return home
from years of brutalities in the LRA. He describes the process of mato oput, practiced in
northern Uganda, to welcome those from afar who are filled with bad spirits, cen, spirits
of war. Extensive deployment of mato oput has facilitated a significant depletion of the
LRA’s ranks. On a general note, many child soldiers return to their communities of origin
through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs. Principle 12 of the
Vancouver Principles, in fact, calls for child soldiers to be included as a priority in such
programs. Disarmament involves the collection of weapons. Demobilization means the
discharge of individuals from fighting forces. Reintegration is the step through which the
former fighter transitions to a civilian role. Of considerable concern is the sidelining of
transitional justice initiatives from post-conflict programming to reintegrate former child
soldiers. The phrase transitional justice designates the range of processes by which soci
eties come to terms with histories of widespread violence, how they reckon with (p. 670)
terrible human rights abuses, and how people within afflicted constituencies come to live
together again. Processes commonly associated with transitional justice include criminal
trials, civil liability (for example, private tort actions, restitutionary claims, and public
reparations), lustration, community service programs, truth and reconciliation commis
sions, ceremonies, rites, rituals, public inquiries, and restorative initiatives. These
processes vary considerably inter se regarding how, to whom, and to what degree they al
locate responsibility for acts of atrocity. They nevertheless share the pursuit of social re
pair through a framework that recognizes the pain wrought by the violence. This does not
necessarily mean that perpetrators have to confess or atone. Many ceremonies, for exam
ple, do not contemplate such methods. Mato oput in Uganda, referenced above, is such an
example—once the egg is stepped on, the time in the bush is no longer discussed—as evi
denced by Alex Olango’s mother.
I believe these processes can promote the reintegration of child soldiers. I have argued
elsewhere, however, that atrophying the three-dimensionality of child soldiers (victims,
witnesses, and actors) into a safer two-dimensionality (only victims and witnesses) weak
ens the place of transitional justice in DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra
tion) frameworks and hence hinders reintegration, notably for two of the most vulnerable
groups of former child soldiers, namely, (1) children associated with acts of serial atrocity
and (2) girl soldiers who have endured crimes (including endemic sexual assault) commit
ted by other child soldiers.58
Another challenge for child soldiers is epistemological. From where do we know what we
know about child soldiers? In terms of the development of the law, best practices, and
policy, two sources of knowledge have exerted considerable influence. These are child
psychology and trauma studies, on the one hand, and reports published by transnational
pressure groups, NGOs, activists, and UN agencies, on the other.
Other disciplines and their literatures have not resonated with the international legal
imagination. Thus, contributions from other fields remain untapped, which is unfortunate
since many hail from the Global South. Examples of undervalued contributions include
ethnographic participant observation, anthropological studies, qualitative research, sur
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vey data, and feminist theory. Another is adolescent developmental neurobiology, which
focuses on the social category of adolescents as distinct from young children. Although
not monolithic, these literatures tend to perceive child soldiers neither as crushed nor as
succumbing, but rather as traversing, surviving, coping, and making what they can out of
bad circumstances not of their own doing. These literatures voice a more dynamic ac
count of child soldiers as interacting with, instead of being overwhelmed by, their envi
ronments. These literatures also tend to place children, adolescents, youth, and adults
along a broader continuum that is less rigidly stratified by chronological age demarca
tions.
On this note, persons under the age of eighteen associated with armed forces or armed
groups largely get there in one of three ways: (1) they are abducted or conscripted
through force or serious threats; (2) they present themselves, whether independently or
through recruitment programs, and become enlisted/enrolled; or (3) they are born into
forces or groups. The first two paths, which are the most common, are not always capa
ble of firm demarcation. However, they are distinguishable and, moreover, should be dis
tinguished.
(p. 671)

Readers may find it surprising, but most child soldiers are neither abducted nor

forcibly recruited.59 The international legal imagination, nevertheless, heavily emphasizes
this path to militarization. Doing so exposes this horrific aspect of the phenomenon of
child soldiering. This emphasis, however, also leads to the under-theorization and underexploration of youth volunteerism. The international legal imagination cannot just wish
away the fact that significant numbers of children join armed forces or armed groups in
the absence of evident coercion and, in fact, exercise some—and at times considerable—
initiative and maturity in this regard.
The international legal imagination is remiss to neglect the prevalence and relevance of
children who volunteer for military service. To be sure, cases arise where determinations
of volunteerism would be specious. Children may be offered up—like chattel—by family
members or local leaders. They may be tricked into joining. They may come forward to
serve as a cook, only to be given an automatic weapon and placed on the front lines.
Some children may rashly present themselves for service because of excessive impulsivi
ty. That said, many children, notably older adolescents, come forward intentionally to join
armed forces or groups. Environmental factors and situational constraints—which include
poverty, insecurity, lack of education, socialization into violence, and broken families—
certainly inform their decisions to enlist. Children’s engagement with these factors can
be more usefully understood as interactive and negotiated processes of negative push and
affirmative pull. In joining armed forces or groups, children may simply be pursuing paths
of economic advancement, inclusion in occupational networks, pursuit of political or ideo
logical reform, and professional development. Although assertions of volunteer service
made by child soldiers should not be immunized from contextual analysis, I believe it is
wrong to dismiss them summarily. Young people may understand volunteerism within the
context of their lives and apply it fairly to themselves.

Page 15 of 20

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: Washington and Lee University; date: 08 May 2020

Children in Armed Conflict
Dismissing what adolescents have to say contrasts sharply with assumptions of juvenile
capacity and autonomy that animate other areas of law and policy. For example, when it
comes to bioethical debates regarding consent to medical treatment and access to repro
ductive rights and technologies, in many jurisdictions adolescents tend to be presumed
competent. International human rights law highlights that adolescents can exercise rights
of freedom of association and expression. So, too, does international family law. This
chapter argues that protective policies predicated upon children being constructed as en
feebled before and during conflict may counterproductively result in children persistently
being treated as enfeebled after conflict.

6 Conclusion
This chapter argues that a more nuanced, and less didactic, account of child soldiering is
a more accurate one. As the late British historian Eric Hobsbawn famously intoned, some
times the point “really is not so much to change the world as to understand it.”60 In this
instance, understanding the scourge of child soldiering, and understanding it (p. 672) ac
curately, is in fact key to changing the world in that such an understanding better helps
to deter the practice and to reintegrate those children caught up in it.
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